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Security: AutomatedLabor/tote

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported Status
v0.2.0-alpha1 ✅ alpha (latest) Cookie transfer + relay + pairing + recovery + kill switch modules built and tested at the API level. UI wiring is the next batch.
v0.1.0-alpha1 ✅ alpha (deprecated) First signed APK. Build-pipeline milestone.
v0.0.0-pre ❌ Planning phase, no code.

Only the latest alpha release is supported. Old versions are not patched unless a critical vulnerability (RCE, auth bypass, key compromise) is found.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security tab → "Report a vulnerability"). Do not open a public issue for anything that touches:

  • The crypto path (app/src/main/kotlin/com/tote/app/crypto/).
  • Key custody / device identity / pairing.
  • Cookie import / export fidelity (especially the SQLite snapshot path).
  • The relay protocol (separate tote-relay repo).
  • The survivor / kill-switch / recovery flows.

Response expectations

This is an AI-driven build loop maintained by the AutomatedLabor org. Response is best-effort by the maintainer. Issues in the crypto or key custody path will be triaged before any release; they will not be silently ignored, but expect delays of days to weeks depending on complexity.

If you're reporting a critical vulnerability (key compromise, RCE, auth bypass), expect a response within 48h acknowledging receipt, and a fix-or-mitigation plan within 7 days.

Known deferred risks (accepted at ship, documented, not secret)

  1. Not hardened against state-actor adversaries. Pairing ECDH (X25519) is not post-quantum; hybrid PQXDH is Phase 3.
  2. IndexedDB / ServiceWorker not transferred in v1. Sites using IDB-based auth will require re-login on destination.
  3. Banking / fintech / government sites won't work — device-binding exists to protect the user's money. We do not forge TLS to defeat it.
  4. No MLS (RFC 9420) for >2-device fan-out in v1. The epoch ratchet (ADR-005) supports 2-device; Phase 3 adds MLS for more.
  5. Recovery code derivation uses HKDF, not Argon2id. TODO for v1.0.0 ship: switch to crypto_pwhash (Argon2id, t=2, m=64MB, p=1) per OWASP. The HKDF derivation is a v1-alpha placeholder; it is NOT brute-force-resistant if the entropy is low.
  6. Keystore password is temporary (tote-release-store-pass). Rotate to a strong random password before v1.0.0 public release. Custody plan: private tote-secrets repo now → air-gapped device + physical QR code later.
  7. PAT rotation is the principal's responsibility. The PAT used to set up CI secrets is in the principal's control. Rotate before v1.0.0 public release.

Anti-fraud bright line

Tote moves your own sessions across your own devices. We do not forge TLS/JA3/JA4 fingerprints, HTTP/2 settings, TCP-level signals, or canvas/WebGL output for the purpose of evading fraud systems. This is a non-negotiable product decision (see tote-docs/planning/DECISIONS.md ADR-006).

If you're reporting a vulnerability that requires us to forge TLS to "make a site work," we will decline. The fix is honest communication with the user (warn before transfer that the site is device-bound), not evasion.

Crypto primitives in use

All crypto is backed by libsodium via the lazysodium-java JNA bindings (v5.1.4). Bootstrap is in app/src/main/kotlin/com/tote/app/crypto/LazysodiumBootstrap.kt.

Primitive Use Standard
Ed25519 Device signing keys (sign + verify) RFC 8032
X25519 ECDH for pairing handshake RFC 7748
XChaCha20-Poly1305-IETF Session blob encryption (AEAD) libsodium
HKDF-SHA256 Key derivation (pairing root, epoch keys, pairing keys, recovery) RFC 5869
SHA-256 Hashcash PoW, BIP-39 checksum NIST FIPS 180-4
Argon2id (TODO v1.0.0) Recovery code derivation RFC 9106

The 67 crypto unit tests include RFC 5869 HKDF test vectors verified against rfc-editor.org, BIP-39 official test vectors, sign/verify round-trips, X25519 ECDH symmetry checks, XChaCha20-Poly1305 tamper-detection tests, and 4MB plaintext round-trips.

Security scan posture

Active CI scans (current):

  • gitleaks scans every PR and push for leaked secrets. 16 rules covering GitHub PATs (all prefixes: ghp_, github_pat_, gho_, ghs_, ghr_, ghu_), AWS (AKIA), Stripe (sk_live_/rk_live_), Slack (xox), PEM private keys, Fly.io, Render, Vercel, and Tote-specific patterns. See .gitleaks.toml.
  • markdown-check lints and link-checks all markdown on PR/push.
  • CodeQL is active (.github/workflows/codeql.yml). Runs but currently fails with "no source code seen during build" — known non-blocking issue with the custom fat-jar Gradle wrapper. Will resolve when we ship a stock wrapper.
  • OSV-Scanner is active (.github/workflows/osv-scanner.yml). Runs when a lockfile exists; gracefully skips until then.
  • An assert-no-app-without-scanners guard in build.yml fails the build if app/ exists but either scanner is still in .github/workflows-pending/.

APK signature verification (per build-learnings headline lesson #16):

  • apksigner verify --print-certs --verbose (NOT keytool -printcert -jarfile, which is v1-only and false-negatives v2/v3-only APKs).
  • Cert SHA-256 baseline: df96cae5c963cef4b2adccd6ccf3a76113a0386e2376232f3dc758374acf4196. Hardcoded in build.yml — any mismatch fails the build.
  • .sha256 sidecar generated alongside every release APK.

Job D (security scan cron) will run daily once v1.0.0 ships, re-scanning full repo history and latest dependencies. Not yet registered (alpha phase).

There aren't any published security advisories