| Version | Supported | Status |
|---|---|---|
v0.2.0-alpha1 |
✅ alpha (latest) | Cookie transfer + relay + pairing + recovery + kill switch modules built and tested at the API level. UI wiring is the next batch. |
v0.1.0-alpha1 |
✅ alpha (deprecated) | First signed APK. Build-pipeline milestone. |
v0.0.0-pre |
❌ | Planning phase, no code. |
Only the latest alpha release is supported. Old versions are not patched unless a critical vulnerability (RCE, auth bypass, key compromise) is found.
Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security tab → "Report a vulnerability"). Do not open a public issue for anything that touches:
- The crypto path (
app/src/main/kotlin/com/tote/app/crypto/). - Key custody / device identity / pairing.
- Cookie import / export fidelity (especially the SQLite snapshot path).
- The relay protocol (separate
tote-relayrepo). - The survivor / kill-switch / recovery flows.
This is an AI-driven build loop maintained by the AutomatedLabor org. Response is best-effort by the maintainer. Issues in the crypto or key custody path will be triaged before any release; they will not be silently ignored, but expect delays of days to weeks depending on complexity.
If you're reporting a critical vulnerability (key compromise, RCE, auth bypass), expect a response within 48h acknowledging receipt, and a fix-or-mitigation plan within 7 days.
- Not hardened against state-actor adversaries. Pairing ECDH (X25519) is not post-quantum; hybrid PQXDH is Phase 3.
- IndexedDB / ServiceWorker not transferred in v1. Sites using IDB-based auth will require re-login on destination.
- Banking / fintech / government sites won't work — device-binding exists to protect the user's money. We do not forge TLS to defeat it.
- No MLS (RFC 9420) for >2-device fan-out in v1. The epoch ratchet (ADR-005) supports 2-device; Phase 3 adds MLS for more.
- Recovery code derivation uses HKDF, not Argon2id. TODO for v1.0.0 ship: switch to
crypto_pwhash(Argon2id, t=2, m=64MB, p=1) per OWASP. The HKDF derivation is a v1-alpha placeholder; it is NOT brute-force-resistant if the entropy is low. - Keystore password is temporary (
tote-release-store-pass). Rotate to a strong random password before v1.0.0 public release. Custody plan: privatetote-secretsrepo now → air-gapped device + physical QR code later. - PAT rotation is the principal's responsibility. The PAT used to set up CI secrets is in the principal's control. Rotate before v1.0.0 public release.
Tote moves your own sessions across your own devices. We do not forge TLS/JA3/JA4 fingerprints, HTTP/2 settings, TCP-level signals, or canvas/WebGL output for the purpose of evading fraud systems. This is a non-negotiable product decision (see tote-docs/planning/DECISIONS.md ADR-006).
If you're reporting a vulnerability that requires us to forge TLS to "make a site work," we will decline. The fix is honest communication with the user (warn before transfer that the site is device-bound), not evasion.
All crypto is backed by libsodium via the lazysodium-java JNA bindings (v5.1.4). Bootstrap is in app/src/main/kotlin/com/tote/app/crypto/LazysodiumBootstrap.kt.
| Primitive | Use | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| Ed25519 | Device signing keys (sign + verify) | RFC 8032 |
| X25519 | ECDH for pairing handshake | RFC 7748 |
| XChaCha20-Poly1305-IETF | Session blob encryption (AEAD) | libsodium |
| HKDF-SHA256 | Key derivation (pairing root, epoch keys, pairing keys, recovery) | RFC 5869 |
| SHA-256 | Hashcash PoW, BIP-39 checksum | NIST FIPS 180-4 |
| Argon2id | (TODO v1.0.0) Recovery code derivation | RFC 9106 |
The 67 crypto unit tests include RFC 5869 HKDF test vectors verified against rfc-editor.org, BIP-39 official test vectors, sign/verify round-trips, X25519 ECDH symmetry checks, XChaCha20-Poly1305 tamper-detection tests, and 4MB plaintext round-trips.
Active CI scans (current):
- gitleaks scans every PR and push for leaked secrets. 16 rules covering GitHub PATs (all prefixes:
ghp_,github_pat_,gho_,ghs_,ghr_,ghu_), AWS (AKIA), Stripe (sk_live_/rk_live_), Slack (xox), PEM private keys, Fly.io, Render, Vercel, and Tote-specific patterns. See.gitleaks.toml. - markdown-check lints and link-checks all markdown on PR/push.
- CodeQL is active (
.github/workflows/codeql.yml). Runs but currently fails with "no source code seen during build" — known non-blocking issue with the custom fat-jar Gradle wrapper. Will resolve when we ship a stock wrapper. - OSV-Scanner is active (
.github/workflows/osv-scanner.yml). Runs when a lockfile exists; gracefully skips until then. - An
assert-no-app-without-scannersguard inbuild.ymlfails the build ifapp/exists but either scanner is still in.github/workflows-pending/.
APK signature verification (per build-learnings headline lesson #16):
apksigner verify --print-certs --verbose(NOTkeytool -printcert -jarfile, which is v1-only and false-negatives v2/v3-only APKs).- Cert SHA-256 baseline:
df96cae5c963cef4b2adccd6ccf3a76113a0386e2376232f3dc758374acf4196. Hardcoded inbuild.yml— any mismatch fails the build. .sha256sidecar generated alongside every release APK.
Job D (security scan cron) will run daily once v1.0.0 ships, re-scanning full repo history and latest dependencies. Not yet registered (alpha phase).